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INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN AMERICAN PRACTICE
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI

Extradition is the process whereby one state delivers to another state,
at its request, a person charged with a criminal offense against the law
of the requesting state, in order that he may be tried and/or punished.
This involves three basic elements:
1. Acts of sovereignty on the part of two states, whereby,
2. a request is made by one state from another for the surrender
of an accused or convicted criminal, and
3. the surrender of the person requested for the purpose of trial
or punishment, in response to the request.'
International extradition has existed as early as the ancient time of
the Chaldeans, the Egyptians and the Chinese, where such agreements tor
the forceful delivery of a requested escapee were bound up in solemn
religious formulas, in the name of the respective deities. Thus, in the
eastern world, the sanctity of international extradition pacts and the
honoring of requests by the heads of state has long been respected and
2
viewed as an essential condition in the life of national communities.
To fulfill such a request was indispensable for the maintenance of
public order since its denial could lead to disruptive consequences as to
the tranquil relations between those nations.
Consistent with the ancient origin of international extradition and
the conviction of the non-western nations that such pacts were not only
desirable but necessary is the basis for the position of classical authorities
such as Grotius, Vattel and Burlemaqui, that extradition is a matter of
right in the jus gentium, and that the asylum nation has the duty to
surrender the accused to the requesting nation. 3 Such a position is
based on the rationale that duties under the Jus gentium are established
*Associate Prof. of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. Bassiouni, "International Extradition: An American Experience and a Proposed
Formula," 1968 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL; 1966 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL 362; and Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
2. Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET.

L. J. 25 (1964).
3. United States ex rel Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONL Lw S27

(2d Cir. 1934);

(9th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955).
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to preserve world public order. The concern for the individual was
very secondary to the primary scope of satisfying foreign sovereign requests to insure good will and peace among nations, which were generally neighbors.
The history of international extradition in the western world has in
no sense of the word paralleled that found in the eastern world. Up
until the 19th century, the relatively new and independent sovereign
states of the west found no need for such co-operative undertakings particularly in xiew of an almost constant state of suspiciou and threat of
war. Asylum was generally granted to fugitives from justice of other
states. A sovereign community could enforce the return of fugitives
only by force of arms and since the threat of war was always impending,
extradition as an inducement to peaceful relations was seldom contemplated. Such history has given rise to the view that extradition is a
matter of favor or comity rather than a legal duty. In United States
v. Rauscher,4 the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
It is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have
imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these
fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial and punishment. This has been done generally
by treaties ....

Prior ,to -these treaties, and apart from -them there

was no well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such
fugitives to another; and, though such delivery was often made,
it was upon the principle of comity;

. .

. and it has never been

recognized as among those obligations of one government towards
another which rest upon established principles of in-ternational
law.
In the United States, under such a rule, it was the general practice
neither to ask nor to permit extradition in the absence of a treaty obligation. However, the relative "shrinking" in size of the earth, as a
result of the technological breakthroughs in communication, and means
of transportation, brought about the death of the isolationism which
had previously characterized American external relations. The trend
toward interdependency of nations and the desire to suppress criminality
gave birth to the realization that close co-operation is required between
the various penal jurisdictions. The greater the concern for world
public order the more governmental cooperation developed to reduce
tensions and deflate potential conflicts. Treaties for extradition of persons charged with or guilty of a crime became both more numerous and
more extended in their scope.
Jay's treaty (1794) included the first international extradition pact

4. 119 U.S. 407, 411 (1886).
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to which the United States was a party. The three bilateral treaties
adopted in 1961 and 1962 between the United States and Sweden, Brazil,
and Israel, brought to eighty-one the number of nations to which bilateral extradition treaties between the United States and other nations
apply. 5 The United States has bilateral treaties with all the Latin
American nations, and in addition, is a party to ,the Multilateral Convention of Extradition signed at Montevideo in December, 1933. The entry
into effect of the treaty with Brazil in 1964 marked the completion of
the chain of extradition treaties between the United States and all of

5. Albania, 49 Stat. 3313 (1935); Argentina, 31 Stat. 1883 (1900); Australia, 47 Stat.
2122 (1935); Austria, 46 Stat. 2779 (1930), 49 Stat. 2710 (1934); Belgium, 32 Stat.
1894 (1902); 49 Stat. 3276 (1935), 15 U.S.T. 2252 (1964); Bolivia 32 Stat. 1857
(1902); Brazil, 15 U.S.T. 2093 (1964), 15 U.S.T. 2112 (1964); Bulgaria, 43 Stat.
1886 (1924) 49 Stat. 3250 (1935); Burma, 47 Stat. 2122 (1941); Canada, 8 Stat.
572 (1842), 26 Stat. 1508 (1889), 32 Stat. 1864 (1900), 34 Stat. 2903 (1905), 35
Stat. 2035 (1908), 42 Stat. 2224 (1922), 44 Stat. 2100 (1925), 3 U.S.T. 2826
(1952); Ceylon, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935); Chile, 32 Stat. 1850 (1902); Colombia, 26
Stat. 1534 (1891), 57 Stat. 824 (1943); Congo (Brazzaville), 37 Stat. 1526 (1911),
46 Stat. 2276 (1929), 50 Stat. 1117 (1936); Costa Rica, 43 Stat. 1621 (1923); Cuba,
33 Stat. 2265 (1905), 33 Stat. 2273 (1905), 44 Stat. 2392 (1926); Cyprus, 47 Stat.
2122 (1935); Czechoslovakia, 44 Stat. 2367 (1926), 49 Stat. 3253 (1935); Denmark,
32 Stat. 1906 (1902), 34 Stat. 2887 (1906); 50 Stat. 1308 (1936); Dominican
Republic, 36 Stat. 2468 (1910); Ecuador, 18 Stat. 199 (1873), 55 Stat. 1196 (1941);
El Salvador, 37 Stat. 1516, (1911); Estonia, 43 Stat. 1849 (1924), 49 Stat. 3190
(1935); Finland, 44 Stat. 2002 (1925), 49 Stat. 2690 (1934); France, 37 Stat. 1526
(1911), 46 Stat. 2276 (1929), 50 Stat. 1117 (1936); Germany, Federal Republic, 47
Stat. 1862 (1931); Ghana, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935); Greece, 47 Stat. 2185 (1932), 51
Stat. 357 (1937); Guatemala, 33 Stat. 2147 (1903), 55 Stat. 1097 (1941); Haiti, 34
Stat. 2858 (1905); Honduras, 37 Stat. 1616 (1912), 45 Stat. 2489 (1928); Hungary,
11 Stat. 691 (1956); Iceland, 32 Stat. 1906 (1902), 34 Stat. 2887 (1906); India, 47
Stat. 2122 (1942); Indonesia, 26 Stat. 1481 (1889), 33 Stat. 2257 (1904); Iraq, 49
Stat. 3380 (1936); Ireland, 26 Stat. 1508 (1889), 32 Stat. 1864 (1900); 34 Stat.
2903 (1905); Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707 (1963); Italy, 15 Stat. 629 :(1868), 16 Stat. 767
(1869), 24 Stat. 1001 (1885), 61 Stat. 3687 (1946); Jamaica, +7 Stat. 2122 (1935);
Japan, 24 Stat. 1015 (1886), 34 Stat. 2951 (1906); Kenya, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935),
T.I.A.S. 5916 (1965); Latvia, 43 Stat. 1738 (1924), 49 Stat. 3131 (1935); Liberia,
54 Stat. 1733 (1939); Liechtenstein, 50 Stat. 1337 (1937); Lithuania, 43 Stat.
1835 (1934), 49 Stat. 3077 (1935); Luxembourg, 23 Stat. 808 (1884); 49 Stat.
3355 (1936); Malawi, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935); Malaysia, 47 Stat. 2122 (1931); Malta,
47 Stat. 2122 (1935); Mexico, 31 Stat. 1818 (1899), T.S. 421 (1903), 44 Stat. 2409
(1926), 55 Stat. 1133 (1941); Monaco, 54 Stat. 1780 (1940); Netherlands, 26 Stat.
1481 (1889), 33 Stat. 2257 (1904); New Zealand, 26 Stat. 1508 (1889), 32 Stat. 1864
(1900), 43 Stat. 2903 (1905); Nicaragua, 35 Stat. 1869 (1907); Nigeria, 47 Stat. 2122
(1935); Norway, 28 Stat. 1187 (1893), 34 Stat. 2865 (1905), 53 Stat. 1561 (1938);
Pakistan, 47 Stat. 2122 (1942); Panama, 34 Stat. 2815 (1905); Paraguay, 38 Stat.
1754 (1914); Peru, 31 Stat. 1921 (1901); Poland, 46 9tat. 2282 (1929), 49 Stat. 3394
(19.16); Portutal, 35 Stat. 2071 (1908); Romania, 44 Stat. 2020 (1925), 50 Stat. 1349
(1937): San Marino, 35 Stat. 1971 (1908), 49 Stat. 3198 (1935); Sierra Leone, 47
Stat. 2122 (1935); Singapore, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935); South Africa, 2 U.S.T. 884
(1951): Spain, .5 Stat. 1947 (1908), Sweden, 14 U.S.T. 1845 (1963); Switzerland,
31 Stat. 1928 (1901), 49 Stat. 3192 (1935), 55 Stat. 1140 (1941); Tanzania, 47 Stat.
2122 (1935), T.I.A.S. 5946 (1965): Thailand, 43 Stat. 1749 (1924); Trinidad and
Tobago, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935"); Turke-y, 49 Stat. 2692 (1934. United Arab Republic,
19 Stat. 572 (1875); United Kingdom, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935): Uruguay, 35 Stat.
2028 (1908); Venezuela. 43 Stat. 1698 (1923); Yugoslavia, 32 Stat. 1890 (1902);
Zambia, 47 Stat. 2122 (1935).
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the nations of the Western hemisphere, and marked the end of a haven
for fugitive criminal offenders from the United States that had existed
in Brazil for half a century. Extradition treaties with many of the new
nations having achieved independence in the past several years have
not yet been realized. However, general treaties of extradition and some
supplementary agreements between the United States and Denmark,
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are said to be currently binding on the former dependencies or dominions of these
states.6
These facts became the more significant in a world presently composed of 140 political units (nations).
The nature and source of world conflicts are gradually shifting from
traditional notions of national rivalries to those frictions which arise
from the nature of a world urbanization process in an age of technological coexistence. Traditional notions of municipal public order find a
broader application in a world context. Private and public wrongs,
which heretofore affected only an immediate societal environment, now
touch upon the stability of the 'world's public order. Increased sensitivities
of world relations to individual factors are either actuated by or result
in the consideration of persons as subjects of international law. The
effect of individual conduct nowadays bears upon the whole world order
by reason of the very nature of its order. The delicate balance of
peaceful world relations and the maintenance of a stable order is ever
more affected by the dynamic nature of world developments in all areas
of human endeavors and accomplishments. Thus world public order
requires a variable dynamic evolutionary content of evolving processes
through legality of means and lawfulness of ends, World public order
is that concept which is designed to secure the proper means for world
development within the rule of law, preserving peace as a condition
and stability as a vehicle to whatever objectives nations may have which
perpetuate the same public order so that the process can guarantee its
own preservation and continuity. The nature of world relations are
no longer based on a strict division of nationally independent courses
of conduct, but evolve toward a concept of independence within interdependence. World public order becomes the ligament of such interdependence and therefore reaches far beyond traditional concepts of
adherence to the letter of the law and specific obligations arising from
classical international law. It is in the words of Professor McDougal:
"The obtaining in particular situations and in the aggregate flow of

6. Evans, The New Extradition Treaties of the United States, 59 AM. J. INT. L. 351

(1965).
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situations, of outcome of a higher degree of conformity with the security
goals of preservation, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation and recon7
struction."
Basic American Modus Operandi
International extradition in the United States is a national power
pertaining solely to the federal government and denied to the several
states. 8 Moreover, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been construed to require an applicable treaty or federal
enactment before the federal government may seize an alleged fugitive
and surrender him to a demanding nation. 9 The federal statute
prescribing the procedure to be followed in international extradition
clearly requires that there be a treaty or convention between the United
States and any foreign government requesting surrender of the fugitive
before extradition will be allowed.10
The extradition procedure prescribed by federal statute may be
summarized briefly as follows."
Extradition proceedings must be
7. McDOUGAL AND FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 263

(1960).

8. Valentine v. United States ex rel Neidecker, 229 U.S. 5 (1936); United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 305
(1944).
9. Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1932); cert. denied, 289 U.S. 713
(1932).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 et. seq. (1968).
11. Generally, § 3181 et seq.; Agent to receive fugitive, § 3182; Authority over offenders, § 3193; Extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States, § 3183; Protection of
accused, § 3192; Secretary of state, surrender of fugitive to foreign government,
§ 3186; Transportation, § 3194; Application of rules, Rule (54(b); Arrest, § 3190;
Extraterritorial jurisdiction, § 3042, 3183; Provisional arrest and detention,
§ 3187; Foreign countries, § 3184; Provisional arrest and detention, extraterritorial
jurisdiction, § 3187; Certificates and certification; Diplomatic officer, § 3190;
Evidence, § 3190; Extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States, § 3183; Fees and
costs, § 3195; Foreign countries, § 3184; Indictment, etc., § 3182; State or territory
to state, district or territory, §§ 3182, 3183; Witness fees and costs, § 3195;
Commissioner, fees and costs, § 3195; Continuance of law in force, § 3181; Costs,
payment, § 3195; Country under control of the United States, § 3185; Discharge
of prisoner committed, § 3188; Escape, retaking accused, § 3186; Evidence, § 3190;
Countries under control of United States, § 3185; Expenses, § 3195; Extraterritorial
jurisdiction of United States, provisional arrest and detention, § 3187; Foreign
countries, § 3184; Continuance of law, § 3181; Country under control of United
States, § 3185; Payment of fees and costs, § 3195; Secretary of state, surrender of
fugitives, §§ 3185, 3186; Hearing, § 3189 et seq.; Witnesses for indigent fugitives,
§ 3191; Indictment, state or territory to state, district or territories, § 3182;
Indigent fugitives, witnesses, § 3191; Juvenile offenders, § 5001; Orders of court,
discharge of person committed, § 3188; Payment of fees and costs, § 3195; Place
of hearing, § 3189; Protection of accused, § 3192; Provisional arrest and detention
within extraterritorial jurisdiction, § 3187; Resistance to extradition agent,
§ 1502; Retaking accused, escape, § 3186: Secretary of state; Fees and costs certified
to, § 3195; Foreign country under control of United States, order of secretary,
§ 3185; Surrender of fugitives, agent of foreign country, § 3186; Time of commitment pending extradition, § 3188; Transportation of accused, § 3192; Extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States, § 3183, Receiving Agent, §§ 3193, 3194;
Venue, hearing, § 3189; Witnesses, .fees and costs, § 3195; and Indigent fugitives,
§ 3191.
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initiated by the demanding nation's filing a verified complaint charging
the fugitive with the commission of an extraditable offense. The extradition magistrate, who may be a federal or state judge or United States
Commissioner, issues a warrant for the fugitive's arrest and detention.
The magistrate then conducts a hearing in the fugitive's presence to determine whether the demanding state has shown reasonable ground to
believe the fugitive has committed an extraditable offense. If 'the
magistrate deems the evidence sufficient, he orders the fugitive incarcerated and certifies the evidence and transcripts of the hearing to the
Secretary of State. The Secretary may thereafter issue a warrant of
surrender upon requisition by the demanding nation. If the prisoner
has not been delivered up to the demanding nation within two calendar
months after the magistrate's commitment order, the fugitive is entitled
to be discharged from custody. 12 However, when the fugitive has instituted review of that order, the two-month period commences from the
time the fugitive's claims are finally adjudicated. 13
When the United States is to be the demanding nation, application
for requisitions must be addressed to -the Secretary of State. If the alleged
offense is within the jurisdiction of the state or territorial courts, the
application must come from the governor of such a state or territory;
if the offense is against the law of the United States, the request should
come from the Attorney General of the United States. The application
must state ,that the fugitive is guilty of one of the offenses specified in the
extradition treaty, and also that the person sought has been found in
the asylum country or is believed to have sought asylum therein. The
Secretary of State then acts upon such applications, in his discretion.
The American extradition process centers around the basic notion
that extradition is a formal public expression of the nation which
affects its foreign relations with all that which the term has come to
comport in terms of international political implications.
The insistence on reciprocity and governmental involvement requiring decisions at the highest echelons of the governmental ladder (the
Secretary of State) to allow extradition for the prosecution or punishment of a foreign national (in most cases) denotes a greater interest for
those political implications than genuine concern for world public order.
The unbridled discretion of the Executive, often based on poltical factors, weakens the expected reliability (of foreign governments) of the
American extradition practice. Such applications (which will be dis12. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1968), see In re Normano, 7 F.Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1934); In
re Dawson, 101 Fed. 253 (D.C.N.Y. 1900).

13. Jiminez v. District Court, 84 S.Ct. 14 (1963); and infra note 64.
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cussed below) contribute to increase world tensions at precisely those
times when the world public order is more likely to be threatened by
strained relations.
Several basic provisions may be found in most general treaties of
extradition. Some of these provisions are reflections of the American
attitude towards the concept of sovereignty, while others are designed to
safeguard the fugitive's individual rights. Nowhere is there exhibited
concern for the maintenance of world order or increased criminal and
judicial cooperation on a world wide basis.
The Problem of Jurisdiction: Clashes Between Vertical
Authoritative Processes
The jurisdictional clause of every American treaty is the embodiment of the principle of territoriality upon which the jurisdiction of the
requesting state and of the asylum state is based. The treaty offenses
provided for in the treaty must have been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting state, and the fugitive must be found
within the territorial jurisdiction of the asylum state. The latest treaties,
though applying this concept, define "territorial jurisdiction" as including territorial waters and the airspace thereover belonging 'to or under
control of one of the contracting states, and vessels and aircraft belonging to one of the contracting states or to a citizen or corporation thereof
when such a vessel is on the high seas or such aircraft is over the high
seas.1 4 In the United States territorial jurisdiction means dominion and
control over the territory. This theory is the narrowest of all theories
of criminal jurisdiction.' 5 However, the United States is gradually
expanding its jurisdictional theories as its interest becomes more significant in such matters occurring outside its confines but affecting it or its
citizens. Such a broadening approach finds support in the constitution
and several extraterritorial theories hereinafter referred to briefly.

Article IX of the Constitution subjects offenses against the law of
nations, piracy and felonies on the high seas to the jurisdiction of Congress. Wherefore, such crimes as defined by International Law and by
Congressional Acts are punishable in the United States even if territorially committed outside the United States.' 6
The imposition of sanctions for violations of the laws of war and
warfare as embodied in the meaning of "war crimes," "crimes against
14. Article IV, Treaty with Brazil, Article IV, Treaty with Sweden; Article III,
Treaty with Israel; Supra note 5.

15. In re LaDolce and U.S. v. Icardi, infra note 13.
16. See title 18 U.S.C.A. § 3231-3241-3041-142-3197

(1968); and Kawakita v. U.S.,
343 U.S. 717 (1952); U.S. v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933); Jones v. U.S., 137 U.S.
202 (1890); U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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humanity," and "crimes against peace" are subject to municipal juris17
diction because of the universality of jurisdiction over such crimes,
which is a derogation to the strict territorial aspects of municipal criminal jurisdiction. In 1927, the permanent court of international justice in
the S.S. Lotus'

s

case

(France v. Turkey) recognized the principle that

in criminal matters, municipal jurisdiction applies in the absence of an
express jurisdictional principle established by International Law.
The territorial principle is based on the right of the state "to exercise supreme authority over all persons and things within its territory."1 9
The essence of stich a concept is predicated upon the sovereignity of
the state and the equality of all sovereigns.2 0 A sovereign entity can
protect itself from injurious conduct engaged into abroad and which
affects the said sovereign per se. The material element of such offenses
against the sovereign, though committed in one territory results in harm
elsewhere. Such a crime sees one of its elements, i.e., the resulting harm
produced in a jurisdiction other than the one wherein the actus reus
was committed. 2 1

22
The Supreme Court ruled in Strassheim v. Daily

that:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing

the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the 23effect, if
the state should succeed in getting him within its power.
It was not until the twentieth century that the United States felt the
need to give judicial recognition to such a theory. The probable reason
is that the geographic location of the United States and its political
complexion did not give rise to such need. Whereas countries with
national rivalries and geographically surrounded by neighbors who may
harbor political dissidents conspiring to its overthrow have found an
earlier need to protect themselves from such expectation. The United
States first saw the need to protect its economic structure and competitive
system of free enterprise by the extra-territorial application of its antitrust laws.24

The resulting legal theory was to consider conduct per-

17. See infra note 65.
18. P.C.I.J. Ser. A.No. 10 (1927); 2

HUDSON

WORLD COURT REPORTS 20

19. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 286 & 325,
FENWICK, CASES
ON INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 820-854,

DITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

(1935).
(8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1956); also

LAW § 420
(2d. ed., 1951);
(1906); 1 MOORE, A TREATISE

(1891)

and

the case of In

3 MOORE,
ON ExrmT-

re LaDolce,

106

F.Supp. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1952); also U.S. v. Icardi, 140 F.Supp. 383 (D.C. 1956).
U.S. v. Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal.S.D. 1960) and Mr. Justice Holmes
in American Banaia Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421 (1932) and U.S. v. Ford, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
211 U.S. 280 (1910).
ld. at 285.
U.S. v. Sisal Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); and U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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formed abroad and having injurious effects internally as tantamount to
the constructive presence of the actor. The conflicting jurisdictional
theories which were faced by American courts were: forum domiciliis,
forum delicti commissi and forum deprehensious.-'- The United States

applied them alternatively depending upon the nature of the offense and
the social interest sought to be protected by the respective legislation;
and conduct where committed which is injurious to the United States
26
as a sovereign is held prosecutable and punishable in the United States.
Gradually theoricians conceived of a doctrine which would allow a sovereign to maintain its jurisdiction over the person of its nationals
wherever they may be.

Thus jurisdiction over the person of a national

when abroad became a corollary to the nation's sovereignty. A logical
extension became that the sovereign has the right not only to protect
itself from foreigners or nationals acting outside its territory against its
interests, but also has the right to protect its own nationals from harm
incurred by them outside its territorial jurisdiction.2
Protection of the
national abroad attaches to his person and subjects anyone irrespective
of his nationality to the jurisdiction of the protecting state.28 The ever
increasing protectionism manifested by such a theory arises out of the
concept of sovereignty and may constitute an infringement upon the
sovereignty of other nations. It represents a source of potential international friction. Probably the clearest application of such a theory is the

continued applications of United States laws over military persons
abroad. However the ever expanding United States military presence in
foreign countries resulted in certain conflicts with host nations and the
United States negotiated several status of forces agreements with countries
wherein the United States has military bases. 2" By virtue of such agreements the host country may be allowed to exercise its territorial jurisdiction over American offenders who are in the military, subject to American authorities consent.

25. VON BAAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIVATE AND CRIMINAL 625

(1883).

26. U.S. v. Rodriguez, Supra at note 19: and Blackmer v. U.S., Supra at note 20.
27. Harvard Draft on Criminal Jurisdiction, 29 AM. J. INT. L. 435 (Supp. 1935).
DONNEDIEU

DE VABRES,

LES PRINCIPLES

MODERNES DU DROIT

PENAL INTERNATIONAL

(1928).

See also 4 Laws of the State of Israel 154, § 1; and Nazi Collaborators
(punishment) Law, 5710 (1950); Meron, Public International Law, Problems of the
Jurisdiction of the State of Israel, 88 J. Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 986 (1961); and
Musmanno, The Objections in Limine to the Eichman Trial, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 1

(1961).

See also the Genocide Convention, 78 U.N. Treaty series 277

(1948),

(effective 1951).
28. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners, 106 U. Prir. L. REV. 567
(1958).
See also, Protective Principle of Jurisdiction Applied to Uphold Statute
Intended to Have ExtraterritorialEffect, 62 COL. L. REV. 371 (1962).

29. See e.g. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A., for a bibliography on
status of forces agreements. See Joint Hearings before the Sub-Committee on
Constitutional Rights, 89th Congress, 2d Sess. Part a APPA. A -P. 861 (1966).
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The problems of conflicts of criminal jurisdiction are largely due
to the narrow and jealously guarded concept of sovereignty. The battles
over where to prosecute an accused criminal overshadow the real substance of the issue i.e. to prosecute and punish offenders. The alternative is to seek the proper applicable law rather than where the accused
should be tried or whether he should be tried altogether because of
political differences between the respective requesting and the asylum
state.30
The multiplicity of jurisdictional theories do not only result in
problems of conflicts of laws but constitute an impediment to effective
criminal law enforcement both locally and internationally while subjecting accused offenders to the risk of multiple prosecutions. Indeed,
under the passive personality doctrine or the nationality doctrine where
more than one state can prosecute for the same offense, the accused will
be subjected to double or triple jeopardy whenever he can be extradited
on acount of an offense committed abroad which may be also punishable
in that country or subjected to the threat of prosecution upon return to
his state of nationality or a third protective state. The defense of double jeopardy is not yet sufficiently established to remove the effect of
such a threat.
The interest in preserving world public order does not conflict with
the concern for preserving municipal public peace which requires effec-

tive criminal law enforcement. Both do not need for their existence the
extinction or abridgement of personal rights. However, all need a
reduction in emphasis of the role and function of national sovereignty
concepts in matters of extradition.
In Personam Jurisdiction:Disguised Extradition and Abduction

The problems of jurisdiction are not limited to conflicting theories
of applicable law and competent forum but extend to the means by
which in personam jurisdiction is secured.
The process of securing jurisdiction over the person of a fugitive
can be by lawful means provided for in the law of extradition and the
applicable treaties, or by means which subvert the spirit of the treaty,
such as the frequent practice of disguised extradition, 31 or abduction. The
means used in the case of disguised extradition are the result of close
cooperation between the governments of two or more countries, usually
neighboring states. 32 The asylum state will refuse to grant the fugitive

30. MUELLER AND

WISE, INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL LAW,

ch.

1

(1965).

31. O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MoDERN L. Ray. 521 (19%4).
32. Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, Paper, I.B.A. Mexico

City 1964.
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the privilege of remaining on its territory by denying his petition for
residence; it can also expel the resident fugitive. These practices are
an exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the state in which the fugitive
sought refuge. Such a state cannot be truly called an asylum state until
it has formally allowed the fugitive to remain. Even then it can terminate his stay at its will without any recourse for the fugitive, either under
Municipal Administrative Law or International Law. The fugitive
has neither the right to asylum and protection nor the standing to claim
any such benefit.
The refusal to permit a fugitive's stay or his expulsion may not
allow him the privilege of voluntary departure or the choice of a destination. 33 Thus, he will be deported or expelled by actually being seized
and literally ejected at the national borders. If the authorities of the
neighboring state are conveniently present at that time and place, they
may seize the individual (who is then) in their jurisdiction and bring
him to trial. Nowhere during the entire course of such conduct is there
any compliance with an extradition treaty (if it exists) or customary
practice of formal extradition. Such a process is a diguised form of
extradition which can be referred to as informal surrender of fugitives
or undesirables. From the standpoint of world public order such a
practice is probably conducive to good will between neighbor states, if
the individual is a citizen of the receiving state, but if he is a citizen of
a third state, such practice may involve that third state whose citizen
was affected by what could be labelled an international conspiracy. In
such a case the practice would seriously threaten world public order. In
any event the practice is a violation of the individual's rights to the due
process of the law.
The most serious threat to world public order lies in the practice
of unlawful seizure of a person in a foreign state and his abduction.
The Eichman3 4 and Tschombe"3 cases will remain landmarks of such
abusive practice. The abduction or kidnapping is a transgression against
the sovereignty of the state wherein the fugitive was taken by agents of
another state.3 6 It is an affront of the asylum state and a challenge to
33. U.S. v. Sobell, 142 F.Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); U.S.
. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520
(2d Cir. 1957); also Ex Parte Wilson, 63 Tex. Cr. 281, 140 S.W. 98 (1911).
34. Bade,

The Eichman Trial:

Some

Legal

Aspects,

1961

DUKE

L.

J. 400;

see

Argentina's protest to the U.N. - S.C., off. rec. 15th year S/4334 and the S.C.
Condemnations of Israel in S/4349; also Musmanno, Supra at note 26.

35. See Luis Kutner's petition to the U.N., Human Rights Commission, filed on behalf of Mr. Tschombe, July 1967.
36. Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 AM. J.
INT. L. 502 (1935); and Peuss, Settlement of the Jacobi Kidnapping Case,
(Switzerland v. Germany), 90 AM. J. It.
L. 123 (1936); Dickinson, Jurisdiction

Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT. L.
231 (1934); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 321 (2d ed., 1945).
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the lawfulness of orderly world relations. Not to mention the individual's human rights. The most serious consequences can result from
such practice on the peaceful relations of the respective states and are
a threat to world public order. American courts accept jurisdiction over
the person of an accused present in court and exercise it no matter how
The means by which the presence of the accused was
it was secured. 3
obtained has never inhibited the courts. Practically every category of
unlawful methods of securing jurisdictional presence has been used so
far; and the courts have tacitly accepted for purposes of jurisdiction such
practices as disguised extradition, abduction and kidnapping, fraud, and
38
This shifting jurisdiction
false pretenses; all have passed the legal test.
over the person of an accused is the result of a world system of vertical
power as between nations. Jurisdiction is after all an exercise of authority and power. It is not subject to horizontal control by an authorita39
tive hierarchy.
The Eichman and Tschombe cases gave rise to international clamor
and demonstrated how potentially harmful the practice is with respect
40
But the practice
to the maintenance of world peace and public order.
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thus disrupting world public order.
The Doctrine of Double Criminality: Reciprocity Within Reciprocity
Extradition will not be granted unless the fugitive is alleged to have
committed one of the offenses enumerated in the applicable extradition

37. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Ex Parte Lopez, 6 F.Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex.
1934); Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured By Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1953) and Garcia-Mora,
Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country
by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L. J. 427 (1959). The latest
American case in point is Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
38. Hunt, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Am. J. INT. L. 678 (1953); and for some
older cases see: State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835), Ex Parte Brown, 28
Fed. 653 (N.D.N.Y. 1886), People v. Pratt, 78 Colo. 345 (1889); also U.S. v.
Insull, 8 F.Supp. 371 (N.D. Il1. 1934), People v. Rowe, 4 Parker Cr. 253 (N.Y.
1958). The rare decision which refused to entertain jorisdiction on grounds that
the presence of the accused was secured by fraud was Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex.
However, Texas has consistently recognized its
Cr. 92, 79 S.W. 234 (1921).
jurisdiction in disguised extradition cases, in cooperation with Mexican immigration authorities.
39. Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions of Legal
Order, 32 T-mp. L. Q. 295 (l961).
40. Cardozo, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction The Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT. L.
127 (1961).
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treaty. Treaties do not define these offenses but only name them, and
therefore some body of substantive criminal law must be applied by
the extradition magistrate to determine whether the act committed constitutes a treaty offense. The substantive law applied is that of the
state where the fugitive is found. 4 1 Prior to 1933, the federal courts
had upheld the doctrine of double criminality, that is, the rule that the
conduct complained of must be criminal according to the law of both
the requesting and the asylum nations in order for the offenses to be
extraditable. 42 Essentially it is a condition of reciprocity of punishable offenses, but when we consider that the United States only considers extradition on the basis of reciprocity to start with, it becomes reciprocity (of
offenses) within reciprocity (of extradition relations). Some American
extradition treaties contain a general provision explicitly embodying the
requirement of double criminality; 43 others are completely silent concerning the substantive law to be applied. 44 Most treaties, 4 however,
specifically require double criminality only with regard to certain offenses, such as financial crimes, 4 6 Interpreting such a treaty, the Supreme
Court in Wright v. Henkel 47 held that when the offense charged is
expressly required to be made criminal in both countries, the law of
the state where the fugitive is found will be applied. Broad language
in the opinion indicated that the principle of double criminality would
be applicable even absent explicit provision. In Factor v. Lau benheimer,48 however, the Court, applying the mode of analysis denoted by
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, concluded that when the

particular offense charged is not among those required to be criminal in
both countries, the act complained of need not constitute a crime in
the state where the accused is found. It was sufficient, the Court found,
that the offense was specified in the treaty and considered a crime by
the jurisprudence of both countries.
The doctrine of double criminality furthers the objective of protecting the individual's rights. National laws may vary regarding certain conduct, and there seems to be some justification to refuse extradition for conduct which is unlawful in the asylum state though criminal within the demanding nation. Such protection has continued to
41. Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 61 (1903).
42. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Kelly v. Griffin. 241 U.S. 6 (1916); Wright
v. Henkel, Supra at note 41.
43. Extradition Treaties with Union of South Africa and Switzerland, Supra note 5.
44. Treaty with Colombia and Ecuador, Supra note 5.
45. Some 64 treaties now fall into this category, Supra note 5.
46. Treaties with Albania, Austria; and Supplementay Convention with Great
Britain, Supra note 5.
47. Supra note 38.
48. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
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49
be afforded the individual despite the Factor v. Laubenheimer case.
In practice, lower federal courts have continued to apply the criminal
law of the state where the fugitive is found. 50 Furthermore, recent
extradition treaties contain general provisions requiring the conduct
complained of to be punishable in both countries by a term of one year
or more.-"1 This is deemed to be commendable, since such provisions uphold the privilege of asylumx for individuals charged with trivial offenses
technically falling within the treaty's list of extraditable offenses.

The rationale for such a doctrine is an extension of the maxim Nulla
poene sine lege.
The law imposing criminal responsibility must not only be formulated as a law but also contain certain elements of notoriety and notice.
These may not hold true in the case of a foreigner who has only entered
the country shortly and who does not intend to become a domiciliary.
However, if the act deemed an offense constitutes also an offense in his
country of origin, then he will be on notice of the prohibited conduct.
To hold otherwise may jeopardize the foreigner who will furthermore
be universally denied a defense of ignorance of the law. A foreigner
who finds himself in the predicament of having violated the local law
without knowledge or intent may therefore seek asylum in a third state
or return to his country of origin. It is less clear what the function of
double criminality is when the fugitive in the asylum state is a national
of the requesting state who has violated its laws with full knowledge
and intent.
The American position is again predicated on reciprocity but adds
the factor of attempting to establish certain standards of fairness which
are designed to inure to the benefit of the fugitive. What exactly is
the American public interest in this respect is at best doubtful. The
practice does, however, add another layer of personal protection to the
fugitive. To presume the inadequacy of the judicial process of the
requesting state or the validity of its laws and to impose such a condition
without apparent public interest for the United States, increases frictions between the respective nations and potentially threatens good relations. In effect it superimposes its authoritative decision to the juridical
determination of the requesting state who claims violation of its public
order.

49. Id.
50. United States ex rel Rauch v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1959) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959) (same treaty and offense as in Factor Case, Supra, note
9; New York Penal Law applied); Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503, 506 (5th

Cir. 1934).
51. Treaties with Sweden and Brazil, Supra note 5.
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The Doctrine of Specialty: The Long Arm of the SurrenderingState
This is a common provision in American extradition treaties, and
the doctrine imposes the limitation that demanding nations cannot
prosecute the extraditee for any offense other than for which -the accused
was surrendered. 5 2 Even where the treaty fails to expressly state this
reservation, the Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine may be
implied from the "manifest scope and object of the treaty."' ' The doctrine is also considered in the United States a principle of international
law that would be applicable even in the absence of express treaty
provisions.54
Certain narrow exceptions to the doctrine of specialty have been
recognized-the extraditee may be prosecuted for offenses committed
subsequent to extradition, 55 or for offenses committed prior to extradition providing the demanding nation has given the accused a reasonable
opportunity to depart from the country. The doctrine of specialty has
also been construed to prevent re-extradition of the accused from the
United States to a third nation until the accused has been offered his
"right to return."5 6 The whole concept of such a doctrine is hardly
consistent with the recognized practice of disguised extradition and abduction.
The doctrine of specialty rests on the premises: that the asylum state
has an absolute right to grant asylum; that such state surrenders the
accused for the special purpose defined in the treaty; that the authorities
of the demanding nation lack jurisdiction over of the accused for all
other purposes; and that the right of asylum under international law
would be subverted if the demanding nation were permitted to prosecute the accused for any charge it deemed opportune once it had
in personam jurisdiction.
This is predicated on the notion that because the United States
as an asylum state had jurisdiction over the fugitive and exercised it in
favor of the requesting state that the United States acquires thereby a
special interest in the individual. As if the jurisdiction of the asylum state
continued over the person of the fugitive after he was transferred over
to the requesting state excepting only his prosecution or punishment for
the specific offense upon which extradition was granted.
While it is true that states may use legal subterfuges to obtain extra52. e.g. Cosgrove v. Winnery, 174 U.S. 64 (1899); Johnson v. Brown, 205 U.S. 309
(1907); Greene v. U.S., 154 Fed. 401 (5th Cir. 1907); Collins v. O'Neill, 214 U.S. 113
(1909); and People ex rel Stilwell v. Hamley, 240 N.Y. 455, 148 N.E. 634 (1925).
53. Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 316-318 (1907).
54. U.S. v. Rauscher, Supra note 4.
55. Supra notes 39 and 40.
56. U.S. ex rel Donnelly v. Mulligan, 70 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1934).
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dition of a fugitive, the interest of the asylum state after the surrender
of the extraditee is less comprehensible particularly if the extraditee is
not a national of the asylum state. The only basis for such a concern
is that the asylum state has exercised its governmental processes for (maybe) the unavowed purpose of the requesting state, in other words, that
it was used for a purpose for which it did not intend to be used. The
logical conclusion tor such doctrine is that its violation by a requesting
state would cause the United States to consider the requesting state in
breach of trust. The potential consequences in this case may also be a
threat to the peaceful relations of the respective nations and hence a
possible breach of world public order. This is particlularly significant
if the United States as an asylum state would subsequent to the extradition seek to prevent the prosecution or punishment of the extraditee
for an offense other than the one for which the extradition was granted.
It is hardly conceivable how the United States can accomplish it, but
an) diplomatic action it may undertake in this direction is threatening
to the peaceful relations of the respective nations. Conversely the conduct of the requesting state is violative of world public order since it
The practice of a state in
provokes the aforementioned reaction.
securing the extradition of a person, whether by threat, fraud, deceit,
abduction or otherwise is unlawful in terms of the states obligations
to abide by an orderly process and follow established legal procedure.
Such a practice may not be considered a per se violation of international
law, but its disruptive effects on world public order are more significant.
Political Crimes Exception: A Double Edge Sword
All American extradition treaties now in force expressly prohibit the
surrender of persons charged with "any crime or offense of a political
character," and some also prohibit surrender for "acts connected with
such crimes or offenses."', - The reasons for the political offense exception
ultimately rest upon the asylum state's sense of humane treatment and
It is
belief in human rights and personal and political freedom. 8
generally acknowledge that political crimes affect the demanding state's
most sensitive desires for peace and security, and therefore inspire a
passionately hostile atmosphere which makes an orderly and fair trial
very difficult.5 9 Asylum states also feel that political offenses, unlike
57. Treaties with Albania, Costa Rica, Iraq, Supra note 5.
58. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. Rrv. 1226 (1962); Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offenses in
Internation'al Practice, 57 AM. J. INT. L. 1 (1963); Garcia-Mora, Treason,
Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses under the Law of Extradition, 26
U. Pn-r. L. REv. 65 (1964); and Deere. Political Offenses in the Law and Practice
of Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT. L. 247 (1933).
59. Id.
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ordinary crimes, reflect the individual's resistance to the regime of the
demanding state only, so that the presence of the offender in the asylum
state is not a threat to its domestic tranquility. 60
The commendable objective of the political offense exception have
unfortunately seldom been realized. The reason for this lies in the fact
that in every case, the definition of political offenses and determination
of whether the crimes charged by the requesting state constitute political
offenses lies with the authoritative decision making process of the asylum
state. Courts have often if not always experienced difficulty in arriving
at a workable definition of what constitutes a political offense. As a
guiding principle, the courts usually begin with the generally accepted
view that, broadly speaking, a political offense is an act directed against
the national entity. 6 1 Thus, such offenses as treason, sedition, espionage
or even verbal dissent ate generally regarded as political-for which extradition is denied. In terms of the classical extradition law, these offenses are purely political offenses or subjective offenses, since they often
have none of the elements of common crimes, 62 whereas "relative political
offenses," are offenses where a common crime is so inextricably lined to
the political act that the entire offense is regarded as political and, hence,
non-extraditable. The United States courts basically adhere to the English position, enunciated in In re Castioni,63 that "relative political offenses" will not be extraditable when two conditions are met: there
must be a political revolt or disturbance, and the act for which extradition is requested must be incidental to or form part of the political disturbance. However, such "political incidence test" has been .broadened
in America so as to include as a political offense any act connected, no
matter how tenuously, to political turmoil. In the famous Rudewitz
case of 1908, dealing with a Russian revolutionary charged by the Tsarist
Government with the common crimes of murder and arson, the Secretary of State overruled the magistrate's decision, and concluded that
Rudewitz's crimes were political offenses committed as part of the revolutionary activity of the Social Democratic Labor Party, and refused- to
issue the warrant of surrender. 64 It is felt that the "incidence test" is
usually broad, since such test may be satisfied by any terrorist, assasin
or guerilla whose criminal acts remotely serve political ends. 65
60. Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the
Law of Extradition, Supra note 58, at 85.
61. Garcia-Mora, Crimes against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition of
Political Offenders, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 927, 942 (1963-1964).
62. In re Fabian, (1933-34) Ann. Dig. 306, 363 (No. 156).

63. I.Q.B. 149 (1890).
64. Case of Rudewitz, discussed in 4 HACKWORTH § 316, at 49, 50.
65. See also the Ruiz, proceeding, Id. 50-52; and the Artukovic Cases, infra note 64.
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The State Department, in an effort to avoid the many difficulties
with the political offense exception, has drafted the exception with
considerable care in the recent treaties with Brazil and Sweden. The
Brazilian treaty exempts from the prohibition "criminal acts" which
constitute clear manifestations of anarchism or envisage the overthrow
of the bases of all political organization in order to eliminate asylum
for such offenders. The treaty also permits extradition for offenses
having political overtones, subject to the condition that the extraditee
will not be more severely punished because of the political ramifications
of the offense. The Swedish treaty also adds that the surrender of a
fugitive may be denied for humane reasons, such as the "youth or health
of the person sought." 66
The political offense exception is a double edge sword. While it is
intended to protect individual rights and personal freedom, it imposes
American standards and values to foreign sovereigns; but more significantly it can, for self-serving interests, deny extradition because the presence of the fugitive in the United States serves its political purposes. The
fugitive may well have committed an extraditable offense but his sudden
political opposition to a foreign regime may render him so desirable
to the United States that his extradition will be denied on alleged
67
political exception grounds.
The benefits of luring foreign defectors and offering them asylum
may be commendable in terms of human rights but highly explosive in
terms of global strategy for public order when the defector also happens
to have committed common crimes.
Too often the political refugee will be a highly placed foreign official
who may have committed common crimes, but their quantity will seem
to cast his acts in a political character.68 It would seem that human
considerations and inducements to foreign exiles, defectors, or fugitives
should not overshadow concern with punishability of those who have
66. 15 U.S.T. 2093; 14 U.S.T. 1945.
67. Supra note 55 and 58 and Artukovic %.Boyle 107 F.Supp. II (S.D. Cal. C.D. 1952).
Ivancevic v.

Artukovic, 211 F.2d. 565

(9th Cir.

1954), Artukovic %. Boyle.

140

F.Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. C.D. 1956), Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1957), Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958). See also the case of Tchels
General Jan Sejna who defected to the U.S. after Dubticek's Coup, Time magazine
March 15, 1968 p. 27. See also the case of Calvin C. Cobb, an American negro
who sought refuge in Tanzania and successfully fought his extradition on socialpolitical grounds, New York Times, Dec. 20, 1967. The defense was rejected in the
case of Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d. 547 (5th Cir, 1962), cert. denied, Jimenez
v. Hixon, 373 U.S. 914, rehearing denied 379, U.S. 858

(1963),

order affirmed,

Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 314 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963) stay denied, 84 S.Ct. 14

(1963).
68. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG. TRIAI.S

IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(1960), Biddle, The

Nuremberg Trial, 33 VA. L. REV. 679 (1947). Finch, The Nurem berg Trial and
International Law, 41 AM. J. INT. L.20 (1947), GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS, (1944).
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also committed common crimes. The alternative to extradition should
be to try such persons in the United States using the doctrine of renvoi
and applying the law of the situs wherein the offense was committed.
While this solution will not fully satisfy the requesting state whose
greatest consideration is the political and propaganda effect resulting
from the denial of extradition, it will, however, deflate the claim that
the United States is harboring criminals. Such a solution may partially
assuage the fears and anger of the requesting state while certainly increasing United States credibility and reliability in the eyes of the
world community. Nothing can more further world public order than
the confidence of the nations of the world that no other nation will offer
asylum or refuge to common criminals or stand in the way of their
prosecution and/or punishment.
Extradition of Nationals: A Discriminating Practice?

American extradition treaties contain generally three types of such
provisions. The first does not refer to nationals specifically, but agrees
to the extradition of "all persons." 69 Judicial construction 70 and executive interpretation 7' of such a clause have consistently held that "persons"
include nationals and refusal to surrender a fugitive because he is a
national cannot be justified under such treaty provision. The second
and most common type of treaty provision provides that "neither of
the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or
subjects under the stipulations of this convention." 72 Treaties of this
sort are the most numerous due to insistence by other nations. The
official policy of the United States in treaty negotiations has been, when
possible, to prevent the surrender of nationals. 7 3 As construed, such a
policy prohibits the Secretary of State from surrendering a citizen of the
United States unless there is an explicit treaty provision based on reciprocity2 4 The third type provides that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations
of this convention, but the executive authority of each shall have the
power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do
so. '75 Exercise of such discretion would be consistent with the treaty
obligation, and the Secretary has both granted and denied surrender of
American nationals under a treaty of this type. In 1947 and 1949, the

69. Treaties with Great Britain, Italy, Supra note 5.

70. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 457 (1931) (Italy).
71. Id. at 475-76, (Memo from Secretary of State Knox).

72. Treaties with France, Iraq, and Venezuela.
73. See 4 HACKWORTH § 318, at 55.

74. Valentine v.United States ex rel Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).

75. Treaties with Mexico, Argentina, and Japan, Supra note 5.
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State Department refused to surrender a total of four American citizens
to Mexico. In notes to the Mexican Ambasador, the Department invited
the attention of the Mexican government to the persistent refusal of
Mexico to surrender its nationals. However, despite a similar refusal
of the requesting country to surrender its own nationals, the State
Department, in a case involving a treaty providing for the extradition
of "all persons" considered itself obligated to surrender a United States
76
national.
Unlike surrender of foreign nationals, this aspect of extradition presents added dimensions to the whole problem. The quality of justice
and system of fairness which has evolved in the American system is far
from being equalled anywhere in the world in terms of individual rights
and personal safeguards. The Constitutional rights and standards of
fairness which permeate the American system of criminal justice, are
unavoidable in other jurisdictions.
These guarantees however, are operative only when the offense is
prosecuted in the United States and do not attach to the person of the
77
national.
Therefore, in view of this fact, it seems more likely that extradition
will be granted to a state which has a "fair" system of criminal justice
and less likely to be granted to the state which has a more summary
procedure.
It is conclusive that such practice stems from a human concern for
the accused but fails to appreciate his criminality or the harm he has
caused to a foreign private interest and the public wrong resulting therefrom. Consequently such preferential and discriminating treatment will
cause public tensions and tend to disrupt good will among the respective
states. The alternative in this case also is to try the accused in a United
States court, using foreign substantive law, and local procedure as would
be the case in federal practice.78 In the absence of a treaty provision
specifically allowing extradition of nationals the United States will not
permit it, thus differentiating between its nationals and other nationals.
This discrimination is based on a sense of superiority in the American
system of justice to the benefits of which all American citizens are deemed to be entitled. It is also believed that executive discretion permitting
76. Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COL. L. REV. 1314, at notes 68 and 69,
(1962).
77. The issue was raised with regard to the constitutionality of status of forces agreement in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) and the Supreme Court held that
a person is triable wherein he committed the crime and cannot object to his
foreign trial on the grounds that he will not be afforded the same constitutional
guarantees which as a citizen he would enjoy in the U.S. if he was tried by an
American tribunal. See also Neely v. Henkel, infra note 85 and 86.
78. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Rule 16 F. R. Civ. P.
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or denying extradition will consider the seriousness of the offense charged
and the evidence available. Such consideration of the facts when coupled
with other factors affecting the binational relations of the respective
countries and other international implications will militate in favor of
allowing extradition. The conclusion still remains that a dual standard
is applied. In the balance are the personal rights of the person sought
by the foreign government, the possibility that a criminal may go unpunished if his extradition is refused and the disturbing consequences
which can be incurred by the United States in terms of disruption of
friendly relations and breach of mutual confidence with the interested
foreign nation or nations. One may also question the orderliness of such
conduct by the United States with reference to its adherence to a rule
of law concept which would require its faithful observance of certain
standards which are necessary for the maintenance of world public
order. -A breach of world trust or failure to observe lawful means in
the course of its public conduct exposes such country to blameworthiness. Not that blame which arises by violating specific norms of international law, but that which results from threatening the world's
interest in the preservation of a public order based on the orderly process of conduct of world affairs, without a significant contravailing
national interest sought to be preserved by such course of conduct.
The Scope of Habeas Corpus and the Rule of Non-Inquiry
Extradition is not the prosecution of an accused nor the means for
testing the merits of the criminal charges proferred against the relator.
The extradition magistrate is by treaty and statute limited to the inquiry into the validity of the process in terms of its compliance with
79
the treaty obligation and the relevant federal statute.
The fugitive's judicial remedies to secure review of the magistrate's order to commitment are therefore extremely limited, even
though United States courts seek to increase their supervisory role over
the substance of the subject matter. No direct appeal lies from an
extradition order,8 0 and the relator has only two courses of actionhe may either petition the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus or
81
petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
to challenge the legality of his detention. The scope of review is almost
82
the same in both proceedings.
79. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920).
80. Fernandez v. Philips, 268 U.S. 311 (1924), McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520
(1912), Charlson v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1912), Collins v. Johnson, 237 U.S. 502

(1914).
81. In re Lincoln, 228 Fed. 70 (D.C.N.Y. 1915), aff'd. 241 U.S. 651 (1915).
82. Id.
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In international extradition cases, the Supreme Court has narrowly
restricted the function of habeas corpus proceedings. The writ cannot
serve as an appellate review to rehear what the magistrate has previously
considered. In Fernandez v. Phillips3 the Court stated:
The alleged fugitive from justice has had his hearing and
habeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the
treaty, and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was
any evidence warranting the finding8 that there was reasonable
grounds to believe the accused guilty. 4
Furthermore, the federal courts have been unconcerned with the
fairness of the fugitive's trial and treatment subsequent to the extradition. On a habeas corpus hearing the subject of the review involvesonly the validity and legality of the extradition proceedings and not
the prospective conduct of the demanding state's authorities toward
the accused.
In Neely v. Henkel, 85 the fugitive Neely contended that amendments
to the federal extradition laws were unconstitutional in that the accused
was not assured the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
United States Constitution upon surrender to the demanding nation.
The protections specifically alluded to by Neely were constitutional prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex posto facto laws, guarantees
of writs of habeas corpus, trial by jury, and the fundamental rights to
life, liberty and property. In reply, the Supreme Court stated:
These provisions have no relation to the crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a
foreign country.
In connection with the above proposition we are reminded of the
fact that the appellant is a citizen of the United States. But such
citizenship does not . . . entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in

any other mode than that allowed to its own people by the country
8 6
whose laws he has violated and from whose justice he has fled.

The rule that federal courts will not consider alleged oppressive
action by demanding states is known as the rule of non-inquiry. Such
rule is brought into sharp focus in the line of cases dealing with in
absentia convictions of extraditees by the demanding nation's tribunals
and that nation's subsequent attempts to extradite the fugitive from
the United States. In-such cases, the United States follows the general
principle of international law that the in absentia convictions are not
conclusive of the individual's guilt, but regarded merely as indictments

85. 269 U.S. 511 (192 ).
84. Id. at 312.
85. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
86. Id. at 122-23.
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or formal charges against the person or persons sought to be extradited.8 7
In the first such case, Ex parte Fudera,8s involving an in absentia
conviction and sentencing of a fugitive for the crime of murder by the
Italian courts, the Circuit Court, on a writ of habeas corpus, chose to
pass over the question of the propriety of the in absentia criminal prosecution and sentencing. The court instead rejected the Italian government's evidence of guilt as "pure hearsay" and released the fugitive on
the ground of insufficient evidence.
The next case, Ex parte La Mantia,) similarly involved a murder
conviction by an Italian tribunal. This time the fugitive alleged that
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution had been violated, since he had been denied the right of confrontation and cross
examination. The federal district court held that "this did not apply
to persons extradited for trial under treaties with foreign countries whose
laws may be entirely different." 90 However, the fugitive again was ordered
released and extradition refused for insufficiency of evidence presented
by the Italian government.
The District Court in the case of In re Mylonas,91 consistent with
prior authority, ruled that Mylonas' conviction in absentia did not
preclude extradition, even though the fugitive, convicted of embezzlement, was not represented by counsel, and had no one appear for him.
Again, however, the court found a ground upon which it ordered the
accused discharged from custody-namely, that under Article V of the
1931 treaty of extradition with Greece, the Greek Government's longdelayed effort to take the accused into custody exempted Mylonas from
extradition "due to lapse of time or other cause."
Thus, in the three above cases, the courts, though recognizing the
limited scope of habeas corpus and the rule of non-inquiry, were able
to free the accuseds and deny extradition upon other grounds. These,
and the general practice, presented however no opportunity to limit
the application of the harsh attitude towards the right of the extraditees
to oppose extradition based on in absentia convictions. Two opinions
voiced disenchantment with the established rule.
In Argento v. Horn92 the Sixth Circuit unwillingly felt constrained
to submit to precedent. Argento, the fugitive, had been convicted in
absentia for the crime of murder by the Italian courts. The murder had
87. Ex parte Fudera, 162 Fed. 591 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); In re Mylonas, 187 F.Supp.
716 (N.D. Ala. 1960); Ex parte La Mantia, 206 Fed. 330 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1913).
88. 162 Fed. 591 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
89. 206 Fed. 330 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1913).
90. Id. at 332.
91. 187 F.Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
92. 241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1957).
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occurred in 1921, and the conviction obtained in 1931, but not until the
1950's did the Italian government initiate proceedings for Argento's
extradition. The court stated:
The appellant has apparently been a law-abiding person during
the thirty years that he has been in this country. To enter a judgment that will result in sending h-im back to life imprisonment in
Italy, upon the basis of the record before the Commissioner, does
not sit easily with the members of a United States court, sensible
of -the great Constitutional immunities ..... however, we conceive
it our obligation to do so.93
Gallina v. Fraser9 4 was decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, which also bowed to precedent, but indicated that given a
proper case, ;the rule of non-inquiry might not be followed. In this case
Gallina had been tried and convicted in absentia by the Italian courts
for the crime of robbery. Gallina petitioned the federal district court
for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that if extradited to Italy he
would be imprisoned without retrial and without an opportunity to
face his accusers or conduct any defense. Judge Waterman stated:
We have discovered no case authorizing a federal court in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United States
to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await
the relator upon extradition ....

Nevertheless, we confess to some

disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations when the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment too antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to
require re-examination of the principle set out above.9 5
This was not such a case, however, because Gallina had been represented by counsel at his trial, and was tried along with his alleged associates who were present before the Italian court and were also convicted.
The courts, therefore, have -thus far refused to undertake the factual
inquiry into the individual's prospective treatment by the demanding
nation. In the event Judge Waterman's view prevails in some future
case, the court might refuse to surrender the fugitive to a foreign nation's
oppressive or arbitrary criminal processes, while his humanitarily commendable concern must be voiced that the criminals do not go unpunished and that a procedure be established in the United States to try
them in American courts for crimes committed abroad, using renvoi
and applying lex delicto with American procedure.
For a state not to inquire about the fate of a person whose extradition is sought would reflect a disregardful attitude toward human rights.
To inquire as to the requesting state's substantive law and criminal pro-

93. Id. at 263-64.
94. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
95. Id. at 78, 79.
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cedure or maybe its penological policies could be construed as offensive
to that state. It would seem that the primary duty of either country
is to seek prosecution and if guilt is established to enforce punishment.
Fears that foreign penological policies are too harsh and that institutional
systems too primitive should not be a bar to the offenders punishment.
The alternative is to enter a sentence in the United States and to have
the offender serve it in a United States institution. Agreements of the
sort would avoid the temptation of inquiry which may result in denying
extradition. In the absence of such alternatives United States courts
will be tempted to floute the rule of non-inquiry because of humanitarian concerns. The result may threaten friendly bi-national relations
and transgress the orderly progress of world public order.
Executive Discretion in Extradition, a Political Tool
Prior to 1871, the function of the Secretary of State upon receiving
the magistrate's certification was considered purely ministerial. Once the
Secretary had satisfied himself as to the regularity of the proceedings
before the magistrate, his duty was to issue the warrant. Thus, in effect,
the sole power to commit for extradition or to discharge was vested in
the extradition magistrate.Y6
Executive discretion was first exercised in 1871, when the Secretary
surrendered only four out of seven persons awaiting extradition to Great
Britain on charges of piracy and assault with intent to commit murder.
No reason for the refusal to surrender the other three prisoners was
97
given.
In the first judicial recognition of this discretion, In re Stupp, 9s
it was found that federal law endowed the Secretary with power to
refuse the surrender of the accused. Stupp's extradition to Prussia had
been certified to the Secretary by the magistrate, although Prussia's
jurisdiction over the offense was not territorial but was based on Stupp's
Prussian nationality. The Secretary refused to issue the warrant on
advice of the Attorney General that the extradition treaty applied only
when the alleged offense had occurred within the territory of the requesting country.
The extent of the Secretary's discretion is not clear, for both the
statute and the courts are silent as to direct limits imposed on such
discretion. Usually the treaty obligation to extradite is absolute. The
extradition statute might be interpreted to grant the Secretary broad
discretion to refuse to surrender in a case included within the treaty
96. 1 MOORE, EXTRADITION § 361. infra note 18.
97. Id. § 363.
98. 23 Fed. 281 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873).
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obligation. If so, although extradition treaties are considered self-executing, the extradition statute supersedes prior inconsistent treaty provisions, under the rtde that treaties and statutes are legislation having
co-ordinate authority."" However, the statute should probably be interpreted to grant the Secretary only limited discretion to differ from
the courts in the matter of treaty interpretation. In fact, the Secretary
has always based his refusal to siirrender tpon a deternin-ation that
the treaty did not require extradition in that instance. Thus, a formulation of the limits of the Secretary's discretion can be derived only inexecLtive and judicial construction of treaty underdirectly from
takings."" o
Whatever such a theoretical formulation migh be, in practice, the
Secretary acts as an authority for de novo proceedings on the precise
issues, previously resolved by the extradition magistrate, and the Secretary apparently considers his discretion only coextensive with the issues
presentable at the extradition proceedings.
The United States extradition treaties generally provide that the requesting state must present to the magistrate sufficient evidence of the
accused's guilt as would justify the apprehension and commitment of the
accused for trial according to the laws of the asylum state. It is in this
area that the Secretary's discretionary refusal to surrender is most prominent. Although the extradition magistrate determined that the evidence is sufficient, in several cases the Secretary reached a contrary conOther instances of the Secretary's
clusion and refused extradition.
exercise of discretion are the refusal to extradite United States citizens
to demanding states which have historically refused to extradite their
nationals at America's request, the refusal to extradite for crimes deemed
by the Secretary to have constituted political offenses, and the deferment of extradition while the fugitive was undergoing prosecution or
was imprisoned within the United States.' 01
Despite its power of review, the executive (the Secretary of State)
has refused surrender of nationals infrequently and only then when discretion to refuse surrender of nationals was expressly granted by the
treaty.'0' Three reasons may be suggested for this infrequent exercise
of executive discretion. First, as the law of extradition has become more
highly developed, extradition magistrates have been more effective in
eliminating those cases that do not give rise to an obligation to surrender.
Second, the courts, examining such extradition proceedings on writs of

99.
100.
101.
102.

Executive Discretion in Extradition, Supra note 76 at 1313, 1316 (1962).
Id. at 1319-1321.
Id. and 1 MooRE § 366.
Id. at 1328.
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habeas corpus are asserting a greater supervisory role, despite their
earlier protestations to the contrary. Third, the State )epartment wishes
to defer to the requests of the other nations, in an effort to maintain
good foreign relations and abide by the orderly process of world public
order.
Whatever the State I)epartment's reasons might be for refusing to
make more frequent use of its discretionary powers, critics feel that the
Department's extradition policies are untenable, and serve only to
deny the cause of human rights and international due process in the
world community. The State Department is constantly urged to be
more active in securing human rights through a more liberal use of its
power to refuse extraditions, especially since the courts still adhere to
the rule of non-inquiry and provide only limited judicial review. Such
critics, however, offer no alternative to the unconditional release of a
person who may be a criminal.
It would seem, however, that since the power to refuse surrender is
discretionary in nature, and as such, subject to arbitarary changes in
executive policy as to its exercise or non-exercise, that adequate safeguards for the extraditee will come only through judicial rejection, as
"prophesied" by the Court in Gallhia v. Fraser,03 of the rule of noninquiry, and a general widening of the scope of judicial review in extradition cases, after the United States lecides to undertake the prosecution
and/or punishment of persons who committed offenses abroad and whose
extradition it opposes. Executive discretion is the most crucial form of
authoritative decision making of purely political character which overrides judicial determination. Its basic rationale should be the preservation of world public order: instead, it is precisely that which it most
often threatens.
Conclusion
Extradition in the United States is viewed as the exercise of sovereignty grounded in reciprocity and based on the political convenience
of the government. The concern is not, unfortunately, to participate
in a politically disinterested struggle against world criminality. Criminals should be extradited notwithstanding governmental political differences and regardless of reciprocity because crime should not be protected.
The concept of aut dedere aut punire should prevail, a criminal should
be punished because of his offense. This should not however overshadow concern with human rights and the search for the establishment of
such guarantees as Professor Kutner's world habeas corpus.' 0 4 The
103. 278 F.2d 77 (1960).
104. KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS (1962) and Kutner, World Habeas Corpus,
Human Rights and World Community, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 1-38 (1967).
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present practice of extradition is full of loopholes and at best impractical. The nature of extradition processes neither serves the cause of
human rights nor the efforts of governments to combat criminality. The
resulting delays and unwarranted formalities cause some states to circumvent the requirements of the treaties. The practice of disguised
extradition as exemplified by the Soblen case' 0 5 and abduction as in
the Eichman case,' 06 set the pattern not only for other "causes celebre"
like the Tschombe case but for such practices as expulsion or termination
of the residence of a person so as to deport him into the awaiting hands
of another state. Those methods which seek to avert the requirements
of extradition are a result of impractical treaties and constitute a constant violation and threat to human rights and due process of law. They
can be avoided by the establishment of a single universal convention on
extradition with a world habeas corpus proviso.107 Equally significant
but potentially more disastrous to the world community is the resulting
transgression of the concept of world public order.
This critical appraisal of the American practice is by no means made
on the basis of a comparative evaluation. Similar practices are prevalent
in many countries, and those nations who avoid the most apparent weaknesses of the system exposed herein do it because they sacrifice individual
rights and disregard basic humanitarian concern. The American system
attempts to balance individual protection and human rights on the one
hand, and the need to preserve an orderly world community on the
other. The results often fail to satisfy either, which is the unfortunate
lot of any centrist position. However the issue of world public order
and punishability of offenders as one of its considerations has not been
dealt with forthrightly, if dealt with at all. The punishability of offenders can be established by a variety of methods such as: trying and/or
punishing the offender in his own country or in an alternative jurisdiction. Human rights can be secured by the adherence to a single
world convention on extradi.tion with agreed minimum standards of
due process in criminal justice. The spirit of such a proposal is
contained in a resolution proposed by this writer at the 1968 Freiburg
International Colloquium on International Extradition, 0 8 the purposes
of the conference was to prepare for the Tenth International Congress
of International Penal Law to be held in Rome in 1969.
105. Supra note 31.
106. KUTNER, Supra note 2.

107. See BASSIOUNI, Supra note 1. The suggestion was made at the 1968 Freiburg
Colloquium on Intoernational Extradition where the author was the American delegate.
108. Supra notes I and 104.
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The Freiburg Conference prepared resolutions and an agenda for the
Rome Conference and discussed the various national reports. The proposed resolution is as follows:
It appears hopeful to substitute in the future to the structurally national concepts of criminality and to the intransigent
consequences of national sovereignty an international concept of
forms of criminality which, by their very nature, endanger fundamental human and social values and for the preservation of which
a closer cooperation between the states is indispensable.
Consequently and in conformity to the contemporary trend to
attribute to the individual the quality of subject of International
Law, it is suitable to recognize that the individual who is the
object of an extradition procedure may uphold before national
and international jurisdictions the prerogatives recognized to him
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by international treaties.
To this effect and with a measure to foresee a general international convention it might be useful that there be recognized
regional or international jurisdictions susceptible of hearing individual recourses directed against the decisions of national authorities rendered in violat-ion of the afore-mentioned individual
rights.
These jurisdictions could also be ceased with a procedure
inspired by Habeas Corpus which would permit and give a more
effective and practical remedy for the establishment of the Rule
of Law on a world-wide basis.
This resolution was introduced in the French language by this
author and was in part inspired by the concepts of World Habeas Corpus
authored by Professor Luis Kutner.
It was joined in by Professor Levasseur of the University of Paris,
School of Law, representing France; Professor Pisapia of the University
of Milan, representing the Center for Prevention of Crime; and Attorneys Paradiso, Torrisi and Giallongo, representing (Catania) Italy.
The Conference members considered this proposition of such consequence that they have recommended its discussion as one of the topics
of the Tenth International Penal Law Congress of Rome (1969).
The question of world public order is an issue of liciety and not
of specific violations of an international duty or obligation. Obviously
a specific violation results in a threat to world public order, but the
liciety of a nations conduct is the -transgression by a state of an orderly
process or lawful condition in a manner which challenges the rule of
law and threatens peaceful international relations. 109 It can best be
characterized as a condition which bends the orderly process or maybe
109. On the question of illicit conduct by a state in international law, see Bassiouni,
The Nationalization of the Suez Canal and the Illicit Act in International Law,

14 DEPAUL L. REv. 258, 258-263 (1965).
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violates it without breaking it, but which leads to retaliatory counter
measures and events likely to disrupt world peace. All of which exhibit
disregard, contempt or indifference to the need for world public order
and its tested channels of orderly processes. World public order is the
Rule of law, and the Rule of law is the basis for world peace and peace
needs the orderly processes of all matters which affect the world's public
order. World public order is the process of secuiring the independence
of nations within the context of world inter-dependence.
Order is the product of a system of action through the inter-reactions
of pluralistic values in the perception realiz.ation of the need for an intersocial criteria of acceptable conduct. \Vorld order is in the words of
Professor Carlston: 11"1 "The global order (as defined) brought into
Thus the action of any state reflects
being by constructive action."''
the state of world public order by its adherence to or transgression of
its norms and processes. In its observance lies the hope of world peace
through the Rule of law.
I )O. Carlston, World Order and I ternational Law, 20 J. I ,
111. Id. at 127.
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